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20篇 您的检索式:作者名="T.C.E. Cheng"
    题名 作者 年代 出处 被引量
1Which Inspection Approach Is Better to Prevent Drug Fraud: Announced or Unannounced?显示文摘In recent years,there are many crimes related drug fraud occuring in China and many experts think that the main cause is that China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA)adopts announced inspection (AI).In order to circumvent this difficulty,CFDA has exploited unannounced inspection (UI)since 2014.In this paper,the authors study the problem of which one performs better, AI or UI.Specifically,the authors consider a supervisor,which decides the inspection approach,inspection strength and punishment to force the firm to put self-inspection effort to meet the requirements of Good Manufacturing Practice,and a firm,which produces a drug and decides its self-inspection effort. The authors use game theory to model this problem,characterize the equilibrium policies under AI, and compare the effects of the two approaches on preventing drug fraud under complete and incomplete information.The results show that under the complete information,UI performs better if the firm's technical level and the inspection cost are low and AI performs better otherwise.When the supervisor doesn't know the firm's technical level,if the low technical level is high,AI performs better.Otherwise, UI performs better if the inspection cost is low and AI performs better if the inspection cost is high.ZHANG Manman ZHANG Juliang CHENG T.C.E. SALLAN Jose Maria HUA Guowei 2018Journal of Systems Science & Complexity2018,31,6:3
2The Effect of Unannounced Inspection on Prevention of Drug Fraud显示文摘Alarge number of incidents related to fake/inferior-quality drugs have occurred in China in recent years. In order to reduce drug crimes, the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) has exploited the new supervision approach, i.e., unannounced inspection (UI), since September 2014. However, the effectiveness of UI in driving drug producers to put more effort into meeting the requirements of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) is yet to be ascertained. In this paper we apply game theory to study the effects of UI on the prevention of drug fraud, drug producers’ profits, and social welfare under scenarios of complete and incomplete information. We show that UI is not always an effective way of supervision. Specifically, if the upper bound on the punishment is not very large, UI can drive the firmto make the largest self-supervision effort only when the firm’s technical level is high and the supervision cost is low. Otherwise, UI cannot drive the firm to make the largest self-supervision effort. Under incomplete information, firms with a high technical level would adopt more self-supervision and make more profit than those with a low technical level. Moreover, we design a new mechanism under incomplete information that can incentive drug producers to make greater self-supervision effort to meet the requirements of GMP under certain conditions.Manman Zhang Juliang Zhang T.C.E. Cheng Guowei Hua Xiaojie Yan Yi Liu 2019Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering2019,28,1:3
3Managing carbon footprints in inventory management显示文摘Guowei Hua T.C.E. Cheng Shouyang Wang 2011International Journal of Production Economics2011,,2:2
4Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach显示文摘Yingxue Zhao Shouyang Wang T.C.E. Cheng Xiaoqi Yang Zhimin Huang 2010European Journal of Operational Research2010,,2:2
5The relationships among leadership, goal orientation, and service quality in high-contact service industries: An empirical study显示文摘Rachel W.Y. Yee Peter K.C. Lee Andy C.L. Yeung T.C.E. Cheng 2013International Journal of Production Economics2013,,2:2
6Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains显示文摘Guowei Hua Shouyang Wang T.C.E. Cheng 2009European Journal of Operational Research2009,,1:1
7Batch delivery scheduling with batch delivery cost on a single machine显示文摘Min Ji Yong He T.C.E. Cheng 2005European Journal of Operational Research2005,,2:1
8Competition and cooperation in a single-retailer two-supplier supply chain with supply disruption显示文摘Jian Li Shouyang Wang T.C.E. Cheng 2009International Journal of Production Economics2009,,:1
9The component procurement problem for the loss-averse manufacturer with spot purchase显示文摘Houcai Shen Zhan Pang T.C.E. Cheng 2011International Journal of Production Economics2011,,1:1
10Impact of risk aversion on optimal decisions in supply contracts显示文摘Jun Wu Shouyang Wang Xiuli Chao C.T. Ng T.C.E. Cheng 2010International Journal of Production Economics2010,,2:1
11Impact of risk aversion on optimal decisions in supply contracts显示文摘Jun Wu Shouyang Wang Xiuli Chao C.T. Ng T.C.E. Cheng 2010International Journal of Production Economics2010,,2:1
12Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach显示文摘Yingxue Zhao Shouyang Wang T.C.E. Cheng Xiaoqi Yang Zhimin Huang 2010European Journal of Operational Research2010,,2:1
13Mean–variance analysis of the newsvendor model with stockout cost显示文摘Jun Wu Jian Li Shouyang Wang T.C.E. Cheng 2008Omega2008,,3:1
14A mean-shift algorithm for large- scale planar maximal covering location problems显示文摘Zhou He Bo Fan T.C.E. Cheng Shou-Yang Wang Chin-Hon Tan 2015European Journal of Operational Research2015,,:1
15Managing carbon footprints in inventory management显示文摘Guowei Hua T.C.E. Cheng Shouyang Wang 2011International Journal of Production Economics2011,,2:1
16Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating显示文摘Danqin Yang Tsan-Ming Choi Tiaojun Xiao T.C.E. Cheng 2011Automatica2011,,7:1
17Managing carbon footprints in inventory management显示文摘Guowei Hua T.C.E. Cheng Shouyang Wang 2011International Journal of Production Economics2011,,2:1
18A tabu search/path relinking algorithm to solve the job shop scheduling problem显示文摘Bo Peng Zhipeng T.C.E. Cheng 2015Computers and Operations Research2015,,:1
19Mean–variance analysis of the newsvendor model with stockout cost显示文摘Jun Wu Jian Li Shouyang Wang T.C.E. Cheng 2008Omega2008,,3:1
20Managing carbon footprints in inventory management显示文摘Guowei Hua T.C.E. Cheng Shouyang Wang 2011International Journal of Production Economics2011,,2:1
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