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23篇 您的检索式:作者名="Fudenberg Drew"
    题名 作者 年代 出处 被引量
1The folk theoremin repeated games with discounting or with incomplete in-formation 显示文摘FUDENBERG DREW ERIC S etc 1986Economitrica1986,,:1
2on the dispensabili-ty of public randomization in discounted repeated games显示文摘FUDENBERG DREW ERIC S etc 1991Journal of Economic Theory1991,,:1
3Evolution and Cooperation in Noise Repeated Games显示文摘Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin 0,,02:1
4Capital as a commitment:strategic investment to deter entry显示文摘Drew Fudenberg Jean Tirole 0,,02:1
5Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm:A Property-rights Analysis显示文摘Drew Fudenberg 0,,02:1
6The folk theorem with imperfect public information显示文摘Fudenberg Drew David K Levine Eric Maskin 1994Journal of Economic Theory1994,,44:1
7Short-term contracts and long-term agency re/a- tionships显示文摘Drew Fudenberg Bengt Holmstrom Paul Milgrom 1990Journal of Economic Theory1990,131,:1
8Maintaining A Repu- tation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed 显示文摘Drew Fudenberg David K Levine 1992Review of E- conomic Studies1992,59,:1
9Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation显示文摘Drew Fudenberg Martin A. Nowak Christine Taylor Lorens A. Imhof 2006Theoretical Population Biology2006,,3:1
10Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations显示文摘Christine Taylor Drew Fudenberg Akira Sasaki Martin A. Nowak 2004Bulletin of Mathematical Biology2004,,6:1
11Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Tirole Jean 2000RAND Journal of Economics2000,,31:1
12Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Levin D 1989Econometrica1989,57,:1
13Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 显示文摘Drew Fudenberg Maskin E 1990Ameican Economic Reciew1990,80,2:1
14Repeated Games with Long-run and Shortrun Players显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Kreps David M Maskin Eric S 1990Review of Economic Studies1990,57,4:1
15The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Informa- tion 显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Eric Maskin 1986Economctrica1986,,54:1
16The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public information显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Levine David I Maskin Eric 1994Econometrica1994,62,5:1
17The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information显示文摘Fudenberg Drew and Eric Maskin 1986Econometric1986,54,3:1
18Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Levine David K 1994Journal of Economic Theory1994,62,5:1
19Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Levine David K Takahashi Satoru 2007Games and Economic Behavior2007,61,1:1
20The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 显示文摘Fudenberg Drew Maskin Eric 1986Econometrica1986,54,3:1
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