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您的检索式：作者名="HE JunZhou"
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| 1 | Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game显示文摘Classical theories explaining the evolution of cooperation often rely on the assumption that the involved players are symmetrically interacted.However,in reality almost all well-documented cooperation systems show that cooperative players are in fact asymmetrically interacted and that this dynamic may greatly affect the cooperative behavior of the involved players.Here,we developed several models based on the most well known spatial game of the Hawk-Dove game,while also considering the effects of asymmetric interaction.Such asymmetric games possess four kinds of strategies:cooperation or defection of strong player and cooperation or defection of weak player.Computer simulations showed that the probability of defection of the strong player decreases with decreasing the benefit to cost ratio,and that all kinds of strategy will be substituted by cooperation on behalf of the strong player if the benefit to cost ratio is sufficiently small.Moreover,weak players find it difficult to survive and the surviving weak players are mostly defectors,similar to the Boxed Pigs game.Interestingly,the patterns of kinds of strategies are chaotic or oscillate in some conditions with the related factors. | HE JunZhou ZHAO Yue CAI HengJin WANG RuiWu | 2013 | Chinese Science Bulletin2013，58，17： | 2 |
| 2 | Cooperation in an asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game with relatedness显示文摘What motivates some members of a social group to voluntarily incur costs in order to provide for the common good? This question lies at the heart of theoretical and empirical studies of cooperative behavior. This is also the question that underlies the classic volunteer's dilemma model, which has been previously explored in scenarios where group members are related or interact asym- metrically. Here we present a model that combines asymmetry and relatedness, showing that the probability of volunteerism in such systems depends closely on both the degree of asymmetry and level of relatedness between interacting individuals. As has been shown in previous volunteer's dilemma models, the payoff ratio and overall group size also influence the probability of volunteerism. The probability of volunteerism decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-to-benefit ratio of the coplayers; in the presence of asymmetrical interactions, subordinate players were more likely to offer public goods than the dominant player. More asymmetrical interactions decrease the probability of volunteerism of the dominant player; overall volunteerism increases with increasing relatedness. | HE JunZhou WANG RuiWu CHRISTOPHER X J Jensen LI YaoTang LI ChaoQian | 2012 | Chinese Science Bulletin2012，57，16： | 2 |
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