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1Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game显示文摘Classical theories explaining the evolution of cooperation often rely on the assumption that the involved players are symmetrically interacted.However,in reality almost all well-documented cooperation systems show that cooperative players are in fact asymmetrically interacted and that this dynamic may greatly affect the cooperative behavior of the involved players.Here,we developed several models based on the most well known spatial game of the Hawk-Dove game,while also considering the effects of asymmetric interaction.Such asymmetric games possess four kinds of strategies:cooperation or defection of strong player and cooperation or defection of weak player.Computer simulations showed that the probability of defection of the strong player decreases with decreasing the benefit to cost ratio,and that all kinds of strategy will be substituted by cooperation on behalf of the strong player if the benefit to cost ratio is sufficiently small.Moreover,weak players find it difficult to survive and the surviving weak players are mostly defectors,similar to the Boxed Pigs game.Interestingly,the patterns of kinds of strategies are chaotic or oscillate in some conditions with the related factors.HE JunZhou ZHAO Yue CAI HengJin WANG RuiWu 2013Chinese Science Bulletin2013,58,17:2
2The optimal sex ratio in cooperatively breeding populations显示文摘In some cooperatively breeding species,elder siblings remain within their home ranges to assist their parents in raising their younger siblings by providing protection or food.Previous attempts to model the population sex ratios of such species have assumed that helping is cost-free and only involves benefits to parents,resulting in offspring sex ratio biases towards the helping sex.However,parents may also incur costs in maintaining helpers.We incorporated costs and benefits of helping to predict the sex ratio of offspring in a theoretical model.Our model showed that the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)sex ratio strongly depends on three parameters:(1) the average number of helpers per female;(2) the benefits that a helper brings to its mother's offspring production(MOP);and(3) the cost-benefit ratio of helping.When one sex of elder siblings provides help,the ESS sex ratio is biased towards the helping sex if MOP costs are less than the benefits,(i.e.,the cost-benefit ratio \1).However,the ESS sex ratio becomes biased towards the non-helping sex if MOP costs exceed the benefits(i.e.,the cost-benefit ratio [1).Additionally,our model shows that the ESS sex ratio becomes biased in favor of the more helpful sex when both male and female elder siblings provide help.These results explain why sex ratios may become biased towardsthe helping sex,as well as the non-helping sex,in some species.Yaqiang Wang Yaotang Li Ruiwu Wang 2014Chinese Science Bulletin2014,59,35:0
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