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| 1 | 公司所有权和公司治理中的路径依赖理论显示文摘世界发达经济体之间,公司结构千差万别。我们提出的公司结构的路径依赖理论有助于理解这些差异。在任意时点,某经济体的公司结构部分依赖于该经济体早期所采用的结构。本文提出并分析了路径依赖的两种渊源——结构驱动及规则驱动。首先,一个经济体的公司结构依赖于该经济体在初始阶段具有的结构。初始所有权结构之所以会产生这种效果,是因为它影响到特定公司对有效率结构的判断,也因为它能够给某些当事人提供动力和权力以阻止对初始所有权结构进行改变。其次,影响着所有权结构的公司规则本身也依赖于经济体在初始阶段所采用的公司结构。初始所有权结构既可影响对何种规则有效率的判断,又可影响利益集团政治,而利益集团政治能够决定实际上选择何种规则。我们的路径依赖理论阐明了为何发达经济体能够顶住趋同的压力而保持着所有权结构上的差异。同时,该理论也为理解为何一些重要的差别可能持续存在提供了基础。 | Lucian Arye Bebchuk Mark J.Roe 宁桂君 | 2011 | 研究生法学2011，26，5： | 3 |
| 2 | Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem显示文摘 | Bebchuk L A Fried J M | 2003 | The Journal of Economics Per- spectives2003，17，3： | 1 |
| 3 | Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation显示文摘 | BEBCHUK L FRIED J WALKER D | 2002 | University of Chicago Law Review2002，69，： | 1 |
| 4 | Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage 显示文摘 | Lucian A Bebchuk Jesse M Fried | 2005 | Journal of Corporation Law2005，30，： | 1 |
| 5 | Lucky CEOs and Lucky Directors 显示文摘 | Bebchuk L Grinstein Y Peyer U | 2010 | Journal of Finance2010，，6： | 1 |
| 6 | Do Short - Term Objectives Lead to Under - or - Over - investment in Long Term Prejects 显示文摘 | Bebchuk Lucian Arye and Stole Lars A | 1993 | Journal of Finance1993，48，： | 1 |
| 7 | Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensa- tion 显示文摘 | Bebchuk L A Fried J M Walker D L | 2002 | University of Chicago Law Review2002，69，3： | 1 |
| 8 | Pay without performance : O- verview of the issues 显示文摘 | Bebchuk L A Fried J M | 2004 | Journal of Applied Corporate Fi- nance2004，17，4： | 1 |
| 9 | L, A new approach to Corporate Reorganizations 显示文摘 | Bebchuk A | 1988 | Harvard Business Review1988，101，： | 1 |
| 10 | What Matters in Corporate Governance?显示文摘 | Bebchuk L Cohen A and Ferrell A | 2009 | Review of Financial Studies2009，22，2： | 1 |
| 11 | A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance显示文摘 | Bebchuk LA Roe MJ | 1999 | Stanford Law Re?view1999，52，1： | 1 |
| 12 | Manage- rial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation显示文摘 | Bebchuk LA Fried J.M Walker D.I | | 0，，： | 1 |
| 13 | Executive compensation as an agency problem显示文摘 | Bebchuk L A Fried J M | 2003 | Journal of Economic Perspectives2003，17，： | 1 |
| 14 | Pay Without Perfor- mance:Overview of the Issues显示文摘 | Bebchuk L.A Fried J.M | | 0，，04： | 1 |
| 15 | Efficient and inefficient sales of corporate control显示文摘 | Bebchuk Lucian | 1994 | Quarterly Journal of Economics1994，109，： | 1 |
| 16 | Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensa- tion 显示文摘 | Bebchuk LA Fried JM Walker DI | 2002 | University of Chicago Law Review2002，，69： | 1 |
| 17 | Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation显示文摘 | BEBCHUK L FRIED J WALKER D | 2002 | University of Chicago Law Review2002，，69： | 1 |
| 18 | Executive compensation as an agency problem 显示文摘 | BEBCHUK LA | 2003 | Journal of Economic Perspectives2003，17，3： | 1 |
| 19 | Managerial Powerand Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compen-sation显示文摘 | Bebchuk L A Fried J M Walker D I | 2002 | University of Chicago Law Review2002，，69： | 1 |
| 20 | Executive compensation as an agency problem显示文摘 | Bebchuk L Fried J | 2003 | Journal of Economic Perspectives2003，17，3： | 1 |
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