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| 1 | A highly regular and scalable AES hardware architecture 显示文摘 | Mangard S Aigner M Dominikus S | 2003 | IEEE Transactions on Computers2003，52，4： | 1 |
| 2 | Power analysis attacks and countermeasures 显示文摘 | POPP T MANGARD S OSWALD E | 2007 | IEEE Transaction on Design Test of Computers2007，24，6： | 1 |
| 3 | One for all-all for one: unifying standard differential power analysis attacks 显示文摘 | Mangard S Oswald E and Staudaert F X | 2011 | IET Information Security2011，5，2： | 1 |
| 4 | Respective evaluation of the prevalence of haemostasis abnormalities in unexplained primary early recurrent miscarriages 显示文摘 | Gris JC Ripart-Neveu S Mangard C | 1997 | Thromb Haemost1997，77，： | 1 |
| 5 | A Highly Regular and Scalable AES Hardware Architecture显示文摘 | Mangard S Aigner M Dominikus S | | 0，，04： | 1 |
| 6 | Correction for beam hardening artefacts in computerised tomography 显示文摘 | Hammersberg P Mangard M | 1998 | Journal of X-ray Science andTechnology1998，8，1： | 1 |
| 7 | A highly regular and scalable AES hardware architecture 显示文摘 | MANGARD S AIGNER M DOMINIKUS S | 2003 | IEEE Trans on Computers2003，52，4： | 1 |
| 8 | High-performance hydrolysis of wheat straw u- sing cellulase and thermomechanical pretreatment 显示文摘 | G Pierre Z Maache-Rezzoug F Sannier S A Rezzoug T Mangard | 2011 | Process Biochemistry2011，46，11： | 1 |
| 9 | A highly regular and scalale AES hardware architecture显示文摘 | Mangard S Aigner M Dominikus S | 2003 | IEEE Transactions on Computer2003，52，4： | 1 |
| 10 | Genetic polymorphism at the glutathione S-transferase(GST)PI locusis a breast cancer riskmodifier显示文摘 | Mangard CM Charrier J | 2001 | Int J Cancer2001，91，： | 1 |
| 11 | Evaluation of thermo- mechanical pretreatment for enzymatic hydrolysis of pure microcrystalline cellulose and cellulose from Brewers' spent grain显示文摘 | G Pierre F Sannier R Goude A Nouviaire Z Maaehe Rezzoug S A Rezzoug T Mangard | 2011 | Journal of Cereal Science2011，54，3： | 1 |
| 12 | One for all-all for one:unifying standard differential power analysis attacks显示文摘 | Mangard S Oswald E Standaert F X | 2011 | IET Information Security2011，5，2： | 1 |
| 13 | One for all-all for one: unifying standard differential power analysis attacks 显示文摘 | MANGARD S OSWALD E STANDEXT F X | 2011 | IET Information Security2011，5，2： | 1 |
| 14 | Optimized detail detectability in computerized tomography显示文摘 | Mangard M Hammersberg P | 1998 | Journal of X-ray Science and Technology1998，8，1： | 1 |
| 15 | Correction for beam hardening artefacts in computerised tomography 显示文摘 | PETER Hammersberg MANS Mangard | 1998 | Journal of X-Ray Science & Technology1998，8，1： | 1 |
| 16 | Malware Guard Extension:abusing Intel SGX to conceal cache attacks显示文摘In modern computer systems,user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware.Additionally,in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on the same physical machine.However,the hypervisor does not protect tenants against the cloud provider and thus,the supplied operating system and hardware.Intel SGX provides a mechanism that addresses this scenario.It aims at protecting user-level software from attacks from other processes,the operating system,and even physical attackers.In this paper,we demonstrate fine-grained software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX enclave targeting co-located enclaves.Our attack is the first malware running on real SGX hardware,abusing SGX protection features to conceal itself.Furthermore,we demonstrate our attack both in a native environment and across multiple Docker containers.We perform a Prime+Probe cache side-channel attack on a co-located SGX enclave running an up-to-date RSA implementation that uses a constant-time multiplication primitive.The attack works,although in SGX enclaves,there are no timers,no large pages,no physical addresses,and no shared memory.In a semi-synchronous attack,we extract 96% of an RSA private key from a single trace.We extract the full RSA private key in an automated attack from 11 traces within 5 min. | Michael Schwarz Samuel Weiser Daniel Gruss Clementine Maurice Stefan Mangard | 2018 | Cybersecurity2018，1，1： | 0 |
| 17 | Malware Guard Extension:abusing Intel SGX to conceal cache attacks显示文摘In modern computer systems,user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware.Additionally,in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on the same physical machine.However,the hypervisor does not protect tenants against the cloud provider and thus,the supplied operating system and hardware.Intel SGX provides a mechanism that addresses this scenario.It aims at protecting user-level software from attacks from other processes,the operating system,and even physical attackers.In this paper,we demonstrate fine-grained software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX enclave targeting co-located enclaves.Our attack is the first malware running on real SGX hardware,abusing SGX protection features to conceal itself.Furthermore,we demonstrate our attack both in a native environment and across multiple Docker containers.We perform a Prime+Probe cache side-channel attack on a co-located SGX enclave running an up-to-date RSA implementation that uses a constant-time multiplication primitive.The attack works,although in SGX enclaves,there are no timers,no large pages,no physical addresses,and no shared memory.In a semi-synchronous attack,we extract 96%of an RSA private key from a single trace.We extract the full RSA private key in an automated attack from 11 traces within 5 min. | Michael Schwarz Samuel Weiser Daniel Gruss Clementine Maurice Stefan Mangard | 2020 | Cybersecurity2020，3，1： | 0 |
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