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| 1 | Executive compensation in business groups: Evidence from China显示文摘This paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups(the so-called'Xi Zu Ji Tuan' in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we find convincing evidence of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation(RPE) in the executive compensation of the subsidiaries of business groups. Specifically, when the change in performance of one subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries,the change in its executive compensation is significantly lower. Further, when the business group is private and the level of marketization is high, the subsidiary's executive compensation is more likely to be influenced by the performance of the other subsidiaries. This research improves our understanding of the decision mechanisms of executive compensation in business groups and enriches the literature on executive compensation and business groups. | Guilong Cai Guojian Zheng | 2016 | China Journal of Accounting Research2016，，1： | 4 |
| 2 | Do business groups affect corporate cash holdings?Evidence from a transition economy显示文摘We examine whether business groups' influence on cash holdings depends on ownership. Group affiliation can increase firms' agency costs or benefit firms by providing an internal capital market, especially in transition economies characterized by weak investor protection and difficult external capital acquisition. A hand-collected dataset of Chinese firms reveals that group affiliation decreases cash holdings, alleviating the free-cash-flow problem of agency costs.State ownership and control of listed firms moderate this benefit, which is more pronounced when the financial market is less liquid. Group affiliation facilitates related-party transactions, increases debt capacity and decreases investmentcash-flow sensitivity and overinvestment. In transitional economies, privately controlled firms are more likely to benefit from group affiliation than statecontrolled firms propped up by the government. | Weixing Cai Cheng(Colin) Zeng Edward Lee Neslihan Ozkan | 2016 | China Journal of Accounting Research2016，，1： | 1 |
| 3 | An Analysis of Private Placement, Nature of Controlling Stake and Industrial Upgrading Effect显示文摘This paper aims to discuss and analyze the distribution characteristics of the private placement among different regions and different industries by state-owned and private holding enterprises as well as the changed earning capacities of the capital before and after the placement. Taking the private placement financing data of the listed companies during the period of 2006-2011 in China's A-share markets as the sample, this study adopts the panel data model to conduct a quantitative analysis of the industrial upgrading effect of the private placement by listed companies with different holding natures. The empirical results show that though the private placement by the state-owned and private holding enterprises has not significantly improved the Clark index in any region, the private placement by private holding companies has significantly improved the growth rate of the tertiary industry in the eastern region. While reducing the proportion of the tertiary industry in GDP in the central and western regions, it has also improved the growth rate of the secondary industry and its proportion in GDP in that region to a larger extent. Yet the private placement of state-owned enterprises has no significant effect on the industrial upgrading path in any region except that it helped to raise the proportion of the secondary industry in GDP a little in the eastern region. | YAN Wu LI Jia LIU Binbin | 2015 | 当代财经2015，，S1： | 0 |
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