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| 1 | Five-year plans, China finance and their consequences显示文摘An important factor influencing corporate finance and economic growth in China lies in its government sponsored industrial policies. Examining China's five-year plans during 1991–2010, we find that state-owned firms in government supported industries enjoy faster growth in initial public offerings and higher offer prices. Further, they enjoy faster growth in loans granted by major national banks. However, this preferential access to capital by state-owned firms appears to be achieved at the expense of non-state-owned firms which are crowded out. Government support induces more investment but also brings more overinvestment, which mainly comes from the non-state sector.Finally, supported industries have higher stock market returns and cash flow growth that dampen when state ownership increases. | Donghua Chen Oliver Zhen Li Fu Xin | 2017 | China Journal of Accounting Research2017，，3： | 76 |
| 2 | Re-examination of the effect of ownership structure on financial reporting: Evidence from share pledges in China显示文摘In this paper, we present evidence that firms with concentrated ownership manage earnings when their large shareholders have an incentive to do so.The large shareholders of Chinese public firms often pledge their shares for loans. Before the split share reform in 2006, loan terms were based on the book value of the firm. Since then, the share price has become critical for share pledged loans. We postulate that the reform triggered large shareholders' incentive to influence financial reports. Using a sample of non-state-owned enterprises, we test the effect of share pledges on earnings smoothing and how this effect changes after the reform. Our results suggest that share pledging firms smooth their earnings more than other firms, but these results are only found after the split share reform. Accordingly, our results provide more direct evidence on the effect of ownership concentration on financial reporting. | Zhizhong Huang Qingmei Xue | 2016 | China Journal of Accounting Research2016，，2： | 58 |
| 3 | Why are social network transactions important? Evidence based on the concentration of key suppliers and customers in China显示文摘Based on a new institutional economy framework,this study examines the formation and economic consequences of social networks(guanxi)from the perspective of key suppliers and customers in China.Results show that commercial activities which depend on networks are determined by the institutional environment.For example,companies that have lower accumulated social capital(less trust among people)and are subject to more government invention depend more on social network transactions than on the market.In addition,this study shows that network transactions can provide benefits to firms,especially in weak institutional environments.Networks can reduce transaction costs by reducing information asymmetry,i.e.,increased network dependence is associated with lower credit costs and lower advertising and sales costs.Networks can also reduce the effect of industry shocks,especially negative shocks,by creating a bonding mechanism.This study contributes to our understanding of social networks in emerging markets by providing evidence on network transactions with key suppliers and customers and their influence on firms'accounting behavior. | Xiang Kong | 2011 | China Journal of Accounting Research2011，，3： | 46 |
| 4 | Economic policy uncertainty, credit risks and banks lending decisions: Evidence from Chinese commercial banks显示文摘Using data for Chinese commercial banks from 2000 to 2014, this paper examines the effects of economic policy uncertainty(EPU) on banks' credit risks and lending decisions. The results reveal significantly positive connections among EPU and non-performing loan ratios, loan concentrations and the normal loan migration rate. This indicates that EPU increases banks' credit risks and negatively influences loan size, especially for joint-equity banks. Given the increasing credit risks generated by EPU, banks can improve operational performance by reducing loan sizes. Further research indicates that the effects of EPU on banks' credit risks and lending decisions are moderated by the marketization level, with financial depth moderating the effect on banks' credit risks and strengthening it on lending decisions. | Qinwei Chi Wenjing Li | 2017 | China Journal of Accounting Research2017，，1： | 50 |
| 5 | Peer effects in decision-making:Evidence from corporate investment显示文摘We show that peer effects influence corporate investment decisions. Using a sample of China's listed firms from 1999 to 2012, we show that a one standard deviation increase in peer firms' investments is associated with a 4% increase in firm i's investments. We further identify the mechanisms, conditions and economic consequences of peer effects in firms' investment decisions. We find that peer effects are more pronounced when firms have information advantages and the information disclosure quality of peer firms is higher, or if they face more fierce competition. When firms are industry followers, are young or have financial constraints, they are highly sensitive to their peers firms. We also quantify the economic consequences generated by peer effects, which can increase firm performance in future periods. | Shenglan Chen Hui Ma | 2017 | China Journal of Accounting Research2017，，2： | 35 |
| 6 | Government auditing and corruption control: Evidence from China's provincial panel data显示文摘Since its foundation, China's government auditing system has played a very important role in maintaining financial and economic order and improving government accountability and transparency. Though a great deal of research has discussed the role of government auditing in discovering and deterring corruption, there is little empirical evidence on whether government auditing actually helps to reduce corruption. Using China's provincial panel data from 1999 to2008, this paper empirically examines the role of government auditing in China's corruption control initiatives. Our findings indicate that the number of irregularities detected in government auditing is positively related to the corruption level in that province, which means the more severe the corruption is in a province, the more irregularities in government accounts are found by local audit institutions.Also, post-audit rectification effort is negatively related to the corruption level in that province, indicating that greater rectification effort is associated with less corruption. This paper provides empirical evidence on how government auditing can contribute to curbing corruption, which is also helpful for understanding the role of China's local audit institutions in government governance and can enrich the literature on both government auditing and corruption control. | Jin Liu Bin Lin | 2012 | China Journal of Accounting Research2012，，2： | 27 |
| 7 | Bank equity connections,intellectual property protection and enterprise innovation——A bank ownership perspective显示文摘This study investigates the effects of bank equity connections and intellectual property protection on enterprises' innovation behavior,and the regulating effect of intellectual property protection on the relationship between bank equity connections and innovation.In general,bank equity connections and intellectual property protection not only significantly increase innovation input,but also improve innovation performance.However,the efficiency of bank equity connections is influenced by the heterogeneity of enterprises and the value orientation of the subjects.Bank equity connections have a more significantly positive effect on innovation in private and central enterprises,whereas the principal-agent problem and government intervention may weaken the marginal contribution of bank equity connections to the innovation of local state-owned enterprises.Bank equity connections and intellectual property protection are complementary in promoting enterprise innovation.Not only are the combined effects of bank equity connections and intellectual property protection greater than the individual effects,but when the latter is relatively weak,the former's positive effect on innovation is obviously weakened and may even crowd out innovation. | Xing Liu Shuiquan Jiang | 2016 | China Journal of Accounting Research2016，，3： | 20 |
| 8 | IPO initial returns in China: Underpricing or overvaluation?显示文摘This paper separates the amount of IPO underpricing(primary market underpricing) and overvaluation(secondary market overvaluation) from the value of an IPO's initial return to evaluate the relative importance of these two factors and their main determinants. Using data on the IPOs of 948 Chinese firms, we find that average initial returns are 66% and that underpricing and overvaluation are between 14–22% and 44–53%, respectively, depending on the method used to assess firms' intrinsic values. In addition, while both the value of the initial return and the extent of overvaluation are significantly negatively related to post-IPO long-run stock performance, overvaluation can predict post-IPO performance better than the value of the initial return. Value uncertainty in IPOs is positively related to both underpricing and overvaluation, and both the underwriter's reputation and the existence of pricing regulation are positively related to underpricing. Investor sentiment has a positive effect on overvaluation but has no effect or a negative effect on underpricing. Overall, our results suggest that in China overvaluation accounts for a larger proportion of the initial return than underpricing,and that underpricing and overvaluation have different determinants. | Shunlin Song JinSong Tan Yang Yi | 2014 | China Journal of Accounting Research2014，，1： | 19 |
| 9 | Foreign versus domestic institutional investors in emerging markets: Who contributes more to firm-specific information flow?显示文摘Using a large sample of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange over 1998–2007, this study investigates whether and how trading by foreign and domestic institutional investors improves the extent to which firm-specific information is incorporated into stock prices, captured by stock price synchronicity. We find,first, that stock price synchronicity decreases significantly with the intensity of trading by foreign investors and domestic institutional investors. Second,trading by foreign investors facilitates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices to a greater extent than trading by aggregate domestic institutions. Third, among domestic institutions with differing investment horizons, short-term investing institutions, such as securities and investment trust companies, play a more important role in incorporating firm-specific information into stock prices via their trading activities, compared with long-term investing institutions, such as banks and insurance companies.Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that trading by foreign and domestic short-term institutions reduces the extent of accrual mispricing. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. | Jeong-Bon Kim Cheong H.Yi | 2015 | China Journal of Accounting Research2015，，1： | 17 |
| 10 | A survey of executive compensation contracts in China's listed companies显示文摘We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than localgovernment-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cashbased payments are the main form of executive compensation, whereas equity-based payments are seldom used by Chinese listed companies. On average, there are no significant differences in the value of basic salaries and performance-based compensation in executive compensation contracts.But, compared with their counterparts in non-government-controlled companies, executives in government-controlled companies are given more incentive compensation. Accounting earnings are typically used in executive compensation contracts, with few firms using stock returns to evaluate their executives. However, the use of non-financial measures has increased significantly since 2007. | Yubo Lia Fang Lou Jiwei Wang Hongqi Yuan | 2013 | China Journal of Accounting Research2013，，3： | 15 |
| 11 | Management earnings forecasts and analyst forecasts:Evidence from mandatory disclosure system显示文摘Distinct from the literature on the effects that management earnings forecasts(MEFs) properties, such as point, range and qualitative estimations, have on analyst forecasts, this study explores the effects of selective disclosure of MEFs.Under China's mandatory disclosure system, this study proposes that managers issue frequent forecasts to take advantage of opportune changes in predicted earnings. The argument herein is that this selective disclosure of MEFs increases information asymmetry and uncertainty, negatively influencing analyst earnings forecasts. Empirical evidence shows that firms that issue more frequent forecasts and make significant changes in MEFs are less likely to attract an analyst following, which can lead to less accurate analyst forecasts. The results imply that the selective disclosure of MEFs damages information transmission and market efficiency, which can enlighten regulators seeking to further enhance disclosure policies. | Yutao Wang Yunsen Chen Juxian Wang | 2015 | China Journal of Accounting Research2015，，2： | 15 |
| 12 | Family control,institutional environment and cash dividend policy:Evidence from China显示文摘Using a sample of 1486 Chinese A-share listed companies for the period 2004-2008,this study empirically tests the impact of family control,institutional environment and their interaction on the cash dividend policy of listed companies.Our results indicate that(1)family firms have a lower cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends than non-family firms;(2) a favorable regional institutional environment has a significant positive impact on the cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay dividends of listed companies;and(3) the impact of the regional institutional environment on cash dividends is stronger in family firms than in non-family firms.Somewhat surprisingly,we find that controlling family shareholders in China may intensify Agency Problem Ⅰ(the owner-manager conflict) rather than Agency Problem Ⅱ(the controlling shareholder-minority shareholder conflict),and thus have a significant negative impact on cash dividend policy.In contrast,a favorable regional institutional environment plays a positive corporate governance role in mitigating Agency Problem 1 and encouraging family firms to pay cash dividends. | Zhihua Wei Shinong Wu Changqing Li Wei Chen | 2011 | China Journal of Accounting Research2011，，Z1： | 15 |
| 13 | Disclosure of government financial information and the cost of local government's debt financing——Empirical evidence from provincial investment bonds for urban construction显示文摘China's slowing economic growth and rapid urbanization have made local government debt financing a significant issue.This study uses a sample of China's provincial government data for the 2006–2012 period to examine the effect of the disclosure of financial information by local governments on their debt financing costs.The results show that financial information disclosure is conducive to public supervision and enhances government credibility,leading to a decrease in the cost of debt financing.Furthermore,increased government economic intervention increases the strength of the association between financial information disclosure and the cost of debt financing.Increased government audit prevention function weakens the strength of the association between financial information disclosure and the cost of debt financing. | Zhibin Chen Jun Pan Liangliang Wang Xiaofeng Shen | 2016 | China Journal of Accounting Research2016，，3： | 15 |
| 14 | Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq显示文摘As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong. | Yunsen Chen Yutao Wang Le Lin | 2014 | China Journal of Accounting Research2014，，2： | 13 |
| 15 | How does smog affect firms' investment behavior? A natural experiment based on a sudden surge in the PM2.5 index显示文摘This study examines the effect of environmental regulations on the investment behavior of high-polluting enterprises.Our data are from A-share listed ?rms in China from 2006 to 2014.We use a sudden surge in the PM2.5 index as an exogenous event to conduct a natural experiment.We?nd that after the event with a series of regulatory policies introduced,investment expenditure declines signi?cantly in local state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs),whereas investment opportunity declines signi?cantly in non-SOEs compared with SOEs.However,there are no signi?cant changes in central SOEs’investment expenditure and investment opportunity.Further analysis shows that investment expenditure and investment opportunity decline for high-polluting enterprises located in East China but increase for those located in West China.Our study is the?rst to investigate the effect of smog on enterprises’investment behavior.Our?ndings reveal that environmental regulation has in?uence on the investment behavior of enterprises with different property rights and regional differences. | Jingbo Luo | 2017 | China Journal of Accounting Research2017，，4： | 13 |
| 16 | Corporate fraud and bank loans:Evidence from china显示文摘Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank,as both the firm's credit risk and information risk increase after punishment By focusing on Chinese firms'borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud,we find that firms'bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower,but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms.In addition,loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before,but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts.In addition,we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the'performance-bank loan'relationship.Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm's ability to source debt financing,which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud. | Yunsen Chen Song Zhu Yutao Wang | 2011 | China Journal of Accounting Research2011，，3： | 12 |
| 17 | West meets east: Understanding managerial incentives in Chinese SOEs显示文摘State-owned enterprises(SOE) are essentially extensions of the government and are therefore responsible for multi-task objectives. The incentive system for SOE managers consists of both monetary compensation and promotion within the bureaucratic system. Political promotion is key to understanding the incentives of SOE managers. In the reform and opening up era, SOEs have been reformed and exposed to political and market forces. The design of incentive systems for SOE managers has thus become complicated and challenging.Our study provides important implications for this key issue of SOE reform. | Qingquan Xin Anze Bao Fang Hu | 2019 | China Journal of Accounting Research2019，，2： | 12 |
| 18 | Government Regulation,Enforcement,and Economic Consequences in a Transition Economy:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies Implementing the Split Share Structure Reform显示文摘In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) as an example, we find that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform process were given priority in public refinancing. We present empirical evidence supporting the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies that completed the reform process in 2005 were of significantly higher quality and that the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our understanding of the efficiency of government regulation in a transition economy. | Dequan Jiang Shangkun Liang Donghua Chen | 2009 | China Journal of Accounting Research2009，，1： | 10 |
| 19 | How does auditors' work stress affect audit quality?Empirical evidence from the Chinese stock market显示文摘With reference to the Job Demands-Control Model,we empirically examine the effect of auditors' work stress on audit quality using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies and their signature auditors from 2009 to 2013.The results show that(1) there is generally no pervasive deterioration in audit quality resulting from auditors' work stress;(2) there is a significant negative association between work stress and audit quality in the initial audits of new clients;and(3) the perception of work stress depends on auditors' individual characteristics.Auditors from international audit firms and those in the role of partner respond more strongly to work stress than industry experts.Auditors tend to react more intensively when dealing with state-owned companies.We suggest that audit firms attach more importance to auditors' work stress and rationalize their allocation of audit resources to ensure high audit quality. | Huanmin Yan Shengwen Xie | 2016 | China Journal of Accounting Research2016，，4： | 10 |
| 20 | Selective enforcement of regulation显示文摘Regulatory agencies may,whether outside of set rules or within their discretion,depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules,which we term selective enforcement.Taking China,a country in transition,as an example,and using cases and large-sample tests,we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement.The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance.After controlling for the degree of violation,state-owned-enterprises(SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies;and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question,the less severe the punishment.It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished.We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously.This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies' expectations of obtaining refinancing.The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies. | Donghua Chen Dequan Jiang Shangkun Liang Fangping Wang | 2011 | China Journal of Accounting Research2011，，Z1： | 10 |
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